This paper aims to critically discuss the versatility of Popper’s theory of three worlds in the analysis of issues related to the ontological status and character of technical artifacts. Despite being discussed over years and hit with numerous criticisms it is still little known that Popper’s thesis has an important bearing on the philosophical characterization of technical artifacts. His key perspectives on the reality, autonomy, and ontological status of artifacts are rarely taken into consideration by scholars known to be engaged (...) in the study of artifacts. This paper consists of two main sections. The first section attempts to present a critical exposition of Popper’s account of reality and autonomy of artifacts. Recent discussions about the longstanding distinction between natural objects and artifacts are brought up and the relevance of Popper’s pluralistic thesis to this debate is pointed out. In addition, attention is drawn towards how to read his notion of the autonomy of artifacts. The primary emphasis of the second section is the ontological position of artifacts. Two separate arguments are posed to challenge the dual ontological status of what Popper called ‘embodied’ World 3 objects or artifacts. The first argument is concerned with the material composition and characteristic features of artifacts. The second one addresses the creative and epistemic value of these artificial products. (shrink)

In his 1997 paper “Technology and Complexity” Dasgupta draws a distinction between systematic and epistemic complexity. Entities are called systematically complex when they are composed of a large number of parts that interact in complicated ways. This means that even if one knows the properties of the parts one may not be able to infer the behaviour of the system as a whole. In contrast, epistemic complexity refers to the knowledge that is used in, or generated by the making of (...) an artefact and is embodied in it. Interestingly, a high level of systematic complexity does not entail a high level of epistematic complexity and vice versa. Prehistoric stone tools, for example, display a unique combination of systematic simplicity with epistemic complexity. In order to attract the attention of philosophers of technology and engineering to the domain of prehistoric technology or what is called “First Technology”, the present chapter aims to examine the epistemic complexity of, ancient Oldowan stone tools. The aim is addressed by critically reviewing and extending Karl Popper’s unconventional objective approach to epistemology and by drawing upon recent experimental-archaeological research on Oldowan stone tool production. (shrink)

The global impact of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) is tremendous on human life, not only affecting the physical and mental health of population but also impacting the economic system of countries and individual itself. The present situation demands prompt response toward COVID-19 by equipping the humans with strategies to overcome the infection and stress associated with it. These strategies must not only be limited to preventive and therapeutic measures, but also aim at improving immunity and mental health. This can be (...) achieved by yogic breathing techniques. In this perspective, we emphasize the importance of yogic breathing,Simha KriyaandIsha kriya, the simple yet effective breathing techniques. (shrink)

The domain of early hominin stone tool making and tool using abilities has received little scholarly attention in mainstream philosophy of technology. This is despite the fact that archeological evidence of stone tools is widely seen today as a crucial source of information about the evolution of human cognition. There is a considerable archeological literature on the cognitive dimensions of specific hominin technical activities. However, within archeology and the study of human evolution the standard perception is stone tools are mere (...) products of the human mind. A number of recent approaches to cognition challenges this simplistic one-way-causal-arrow view and emphasizes instead the functional efficiency of tools or artifacts in transforming and augmenting human cognitive capacities. As a result, the very idea that tools or artifacts are intimately tied to human cognitive processes is fast becoming an alternative within the cognitive sciences and a few allied disciplines. The present study intends to explore its implications for philosophy of technology. The central objective of this paper is to examine the dynamic and intricate tool-mediated activities of the early hominins through the lens of Don Ihde’s post-phenomenological theory of human-technology relations and Lambros Malafouris’ Material Engagement Theory. Highlighting the key points where these two research approaches, despite their subtle nuances, converge and look capable of mutually catalyzing each other, the paper attempts to show why it is important to bring these approaches together for a more refined understanding of the controversial role these stone tools played in human evolution. (shrink)

Modern (theoretical) physics seems to be in deep crisis today as many of its core aspects are not empirically well-confirmed. Heated exchanges among physicists on the scientific status of physical theories with little or, at best, a tenuous connection to possible experimental tests is highly visible in the popular scientific literature. Some physicists (e.g., Carroll 2014, 2019; Ijjas et al., 2017) argue that science must discard empirical testability as one of its defining properties and the highly explanatory theories of present-day (...) physics should be exempted from experimental testing, while others (e.g., Ellis & Silk 2014) spot in these arguments (for softening the testability or falsifiability requirement for modern physics) a dangerous tendency to undermine science. The philosopher of science who naturally draws most attention in these current debates is Karl Popper (1902-1994). His views, however, are often misrepresented in these debates. The prime objective of this paper is to explain how a more enlightened perspective on the ongoing debates can be obtained by a careful scrutiny of the Popperian criterion of falsifiability. As a first step in achieving this objective we will analyze the two major (conceptual) failures on which the current controversies rest. Our next step will be examining the controversial string theory to see whether the criteria of falsifiability is a ‘blunt instrument’ for determining its scientific status. (shrink)

Ce texte vise à montrer les ressources variées de la thèse des trois mondes de Karl Popper dans l’analyse des questions liées au statut ontologique des artefacts matériels. Bien qu’elle ait été discutée depuis des années, et qu’elle ait fait l’objet de nombreuses critiques, on n’a presque pas remarqué que la thèse de Popper fournit d’excellentes idées pour la description philosophique des artefacts. Ce texte comprend deux sections. Dans la première, on donne un exposé critique des thèses de Popper quant (...) à la réalité et à l’autonomie des artefacts. La seconde section présente deux arguments. Le premier se concentre sur la composition et les caractéristiques des artefacts matériels, et le second souligne leurs aspects créatifs et épistémiques. (shrink)

Ce texte vise à montrer les ressources variées de la thèse des trois mondes de Karl Popper dans l’analyse des questions liées au statut ontologique des artefacts matériels. Bien qu’elle ait été discutée depuis des années, et qu’elle ait fait l’objet de nombreuses critiques, on n’a presque pas remarqué que la thèse de Popper fournit d’excellentes idées pour la description philosophique des artefacts. Ce texte comprend deux sections. Dans la première, on donne un exposé critique des thèses de Popper quant (...) à la réalité et à l’autonomie (partielle) des artefacts. La seconde section présente deux arguments. Le premier se concentre sur la composition et les caractéristiques des artefacts matériels, et le second souligne leurs aspects créatifs et épistémiques. (shrink)

A historical investigation of the exclusion of Africa and Asia from modern histories of philosophy.

Embryonic development in Drosophila melanogaster begins with a rapid series of mitotic nuclear divisions, unaccompanied by cytokinesis, to produce a multi‐nucleated single cell embryo, the syncytial blastoderm. The syncytium then undergoes a process of cell formation, in which the individual nuclei become enclosed in individual cells. This process of cellularization involves integrating mechanisms of cell polarity, cell–cell adhesion and a specialized form of cytokinesis. The detailed molecular mechanism, however, is highly complex and, despite extensive analysis, remains poorly understood. Nevertheless, new (...) insights are emerging from recent studies on aspects of membrane polarization and insertion, which show that membrane components from intracellular organelles are involved. In addition, actin and actin‐associated proteins have been heavily implicated while new evidence shows that microtubule cytoskeletal elements are mechanistically involved in all aspects of cellularization. This review will draw on both the traditional models and the new data to provide a current perspective on the nature of cellular blastoderm formation in Drosophila melanogaster. BioEssays 24:1012–1022, 2002. © 2002 Wiley‐Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

In this paper, we would like to discuss Wittgenstein’s critique of the idea that a person’s experiences are necessarily private, and these experiences can only be expressible in a private language. Taking a clue from Wittgenstein, we intend to say that the person’s experiences though private, can also be known by others. In the following sections 243 of his Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein argues against the possibility of a private language about the subject’s inner experiences. He contends that by coining names/words (...) to name sensations and our inner experiences, we cannot create a private language. If we have a list of names, that cannot function as a language. We need predicate terms; we need the syntax to link the words in the form of a sentence. If we use private names and use the predicates from the language that everyone knows, then the private words will acquire public status like the terms ‘pain’ and ‘sensation.’ These terms are already part of the public language, and if private experiences like pain and sensation cannot be made public, we would not have these terms in our language at all. This is the reason why any application of words is public, and therefore, there is no possibility of a private language. Wittgenstein concentrates on the public rules that govern the correct application for the use of words. And the expressions are meaningful only when these are used according to rules of grammar; if these expressions do not follow any rules of grammar, these are simply meaningless. (shrink)

In this paper, we will discuss solipsism and the limits of experience in the light of Wittgenstein’s TLP. One cannot draw the limits of experience without bringing in the notion of the experiencer. That is to say, the notion of self is very relevant to the discussion on the limits of experience. Solipsism means that ‘I’ is the only reality, and what I experience is all that I could know. We will focus on solipsism from two points of view, the (...) empirical point of view and the transcendental point of view. The empirical approach to solipsism makes the self as a matter of its experience. However, from the transcendental point of view, the transcendental or metaphysical self becomes the transcendental ground of our experiences. In the second section, we will discuss the relationship between solipsism and realism. Then how the self is related to the world will be discussed in the third section. For Wittgenstein, the self ‘I' is neither causally nor logically related to the world. This self is the metaphysical subject, and it is the limit of the world. In the fourth section, we will discuss the importance of the limit-self. The limit-self is not the matter or object of experience; rather, it is the ground of our world's experience. For Wittgenstein, it is not an item of the world; rather, it is the limit of the world. The limit-self cannot be described in language, and thus it is beyond our language. It is the limit of our language and also the limit of the world. Then, we will critically analyze the limit of experience, and the metaphysical self is placed on the limit of experience. This self is the non-solipsistic self. (shrink)

Expression is the central concept in Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mind, and our experiences are reflected in our bodily expressions or gestures, facial expressions, behaviors and linguistic expressions. It seems true that we have no access of other people’s experiences but we can know or talk about them in so far as they are the common experiences of all. This inaccessibility of other’s experiences may create a genuine thinking that one’s experiences are private and the first person present tense psychological utterances (...) are not descriptive at all. They are understood solely as expressive and expression is the outer concept of a mental phenomenon. In this paper, an attempt will be made on the basis of Wittgenstein’s critique of the relationship between the concepts of experience and expression we shall argue that certain uses of the dichotomy between the inner and the outer are mistakes. According to Wittgenstein, the inner is not a set of experiences which are or are not expressed by our immediate (primitive) expressions or linguistic expressions rather it is the capacity of the subject to express himself genuinely. (shrink)

Knowledge is an asset that can make or break organizations. Its importance has been duly asserted in the Western management thought as well as in the Indian classical philosophical thought. The present study takes a hermeneutical approach by reviewing the Western literature related to knowledge and then trying to find congruence with the Indian philosophy of Nyaya Sutras. Nyaya is a branch of Indian philosophical thought; these thoughts were written in the form of verses called the sutras. We draw from (...) the modern knowledge management literature and compare and contrast it with selected verses of Nyaya Sutras. We find a high level of similarity between the two and discuss offerings from Nyaya Sutras that can be adopted by the modern knowledge management domain. The key aspects of our work have been consolidated in a conceptual model for knowledge management which will provide useful insights to modern management practices. (shrink)

How (Not) to Be Secular is what Jamie Smith calls "your hitchhiker's guide to the present" -- it is both a reading guide to Charles Taylor's monumental work A Secular Age and philosophical guidance on how we might learn to live in our times. Taylor's landmark book A Secular Age (2007) provides a monumental, incisive analysis of what it means to live in the post-Christian present -- a pluralist world of competing beliefs and growing unbelief. Jamie Smith's book is a (...) compact field guide to Taylor's insightful study of the secular, making that very significant but daunting work accessible to a wide array of readers. Even more, though, Smith's How (Not) to Be Secular is a practical philosophical guidebook, a kind of how-to manual on how to live in our secular age. It ultimately offers us an adventure in self-understanding and maps out a way to get our bearings in today's secular culture, no matter who "we" are -- whether believers or skeptics, devout or doubting, self-assured or puzzled and confused. This is a book for any thinking person to chew on. (shrink)

This chapter provides an introduction to higher-order metaphysics as well as to the contributions to this volume. We discuss five topics, corresponding to the five parts of this volume, and summarize the contributions to each part. First, we motivate the usefulness of higher-order quantification in metaphysics using a number of examples, and discuss the question of how such quantifiers should be interpreted. We provide a brief introduction to the most common forms of higher-order logics used in metaphysics, and indicate a (...) number of questions which can be raised in such systems using logical vocabulary alone. Using a further example, we return to applications of higher-order logics in metaphysics. We also mention key developments in the history of higher-order logic as it pertains to metaphysics. Finally, we mention certain arguments which have been raised against the use of higher-order logic, and some ways of responding to them. (shrink)

This article argues that the literary contexts of Horace's Odes 3.13, especially archaic Greek poetry, have been relatively neglected by scholars, who have focussed on identifying the location of the fons Bandusiae and on understanding the significance of the sustained description of the kid sacrifice. This study presents a more holistic interpretation of the ode by exploring Horace's interactions with previously unnoticed (Alcaeus, frr. 45 and 347) and underappreciated (Hes. Op. 582–96) archaic Greek poetic intertexts, which also offer a fresh (...) perspective on earlier debates. Horace's use of Alcaeus’ fr. 45, a key intertext, firmly places the fons Bandusiae within the literary landscape of Horace's Sabine estate, and offers a structural and argumentative model for Odes 3.13; further, Alcaean and Hesiodic allusions also suggest that the kid is sacrificed as a surrogate for Horace for keeping him safe. These conclusions are used to offer a new interpretation of the ode on metapoetic, political and philosophical levels, and to explore how these different aspects of the ode interact with Horace's other odes. (shrink)

Practical deliberation often involves conditional judgements about what will (likely) happen if certain alternatives are pursued. It is widely assumed that the conditionals useful in deliberation are counterfactual or subjunctive conditionals. Against this, I argue that the conditionals of deliberation are indicatives. Key to the argument is an account of the relation between 'straightforward' future-directed conditionals like ' If the house is not painted, it will soon look quite shabby' and * "w e r e ' ' e d F (...) D C s like ' If the house were not to be painted, it would soon look quite shabby': an account on which both of these types of FDCs are grouped with the indicatives for semantic treatment and on which, while conditionals of both types are properly used in means/ends deliberations, those of the ' were'ed-up variety are especially well suited for that purpose. (shrink)

In the traditional form of canonical quantization, certain field components (not having “conjugate” momenta) must be regarded as noncanonical. This long-known distinction enters modern gauge theories, when they are canonically quantized as by Kugo and Ojima. We avoid that peculiarity by not using any conjugate “momenta” at all. In our formulation, canonical quantization can be related to Feynman's path integral.

In natural language processing (NLP), named entity recognition (NER) and semantic classification are essential tasks. NER is a fundamental task, that identify named entities in text such as people, organizations, and locations. In Legal domain, NER is particularly important due to the variety of named entities that appear in legal documents and are important for legal analysis whereas Semantic classification is the process of giving each sentence in a text a semantic label, such as ”fact,””arguments,” or”judgement”. Both NER and Semantic (...) classi- fication are critical component of many NLP applications such as Knowledge base construction and semantic search. Semantic searching of legal documents is a powerful technique that can be used to quickly find the information that you need. By combining NER and semantic classification, one can identify the key elements of a legal document and search for documents that are related to a particular topic or contain a particular type of information. This paper proposes a novel approach to NER and Semantic classification in legal domain using Long short-term memory (LSTM) model. The proposed approach is evaluated on a corpus of legal text and the result of this study suggest that LSTM models are a promising approach for NER and Semantic classification in legal domain and can be used to improve the performance of semantic searching of legal documents. (shrink)

Aggregating individuals’ consistent attitudes might produce inconsistent collective attitudes. Some groups therefore need the capacity to form attitudes that are irreducible to those of their members. Such groups, group-agent realists argue, are agents in control of their own attitude formation. In this paper, however, I show how group-agent realism overlooks the important fact that groups consist of strategically interacting agents. Only by eliminating group agency from our social explanations can we see how individuals vote strategically to gain control of their (...) groups and produce collective attitudes we cannot make sense of if we treat groups as agents. (shrink)

In this short but meaty book, Peter Unger questions the objective answers that have been given to central problems in philosophy. As Unger hypothesizes, many of these problems are unanswerable, including the problems of knowledge and scepticism, the problems of free will, and problems of causation and explanation. In each case, he argues, we arrive at one answer only relative to an assumption about the meaning of key terms, terms like "know" and like "cause," even while we arrive at an (...) opposite answer relative to quite different assumptions, but equally arbitrary assumptions, about what the key terms mean. (shrink)

Putative counterexamples to the Principle of Identity of Indiscernibles (PII) are notoriously inconclusive. I establish ground rules for debate in this area, offer a new response to such counterexamples for friends of the PII, but then argue that no response is entirely satisfactory. Finally, I undermine some positive arguments for PII.

Philosophers have long tried to understand scientific change in terms of a dynamics of revision within ‘theoretical frameworks,’ ‘disciplinary matrices,’ ‘scientific paradigms’ or ‘conceptual schemes.’ No-one, however, has made clear precisely how one might model such a conceptual scheme, nor what form change dynamics within such a structure could be expected to take. In this paper we take some first steps in applying network theory to the issue, modeling conceptual schemes as simple networks and the dynamics of change as cascades (...) on those networks. The results allow a new understanding of two traditional approaches—Popper and Kuhn—as well as introducing the intriguing prospect of viewing scientific change using the metaphor of selforganizing criticality. (shrink)